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APOLLOSPACECRA'T 
Tht' spact'naft (SIC) consists of a launch t'scapt' systt'm (LIS) asSt'1II­
bly. command modult' (C/M), st'rvict' modult' (SIM), and tht' spact'craftl 
lunar modult' adaptt'r (SLA). Tht' LIS asst'mbly providt'S the means for 
rapidly St'parati",~ tht' ClM from tht' SIM durinK pad or suborbital aborts. 
Tht' C,'M forms tht' spact'n;aft control ct'ntt'r, contains nt'Ct'ssary auto­
matic and manual t'quipmt'nt to control and monitor tht' spacccraft 
systt'ms, and contains tht' rt'quirt'd c:quipmt'nt for saft'ty and comfo" of 
tht' crt'w. Tht" SIM is a cylindrical slrUClurt' locatt'd bt'twt't'n tht' CIM 
and Iht' SLA. II contains Iht' propulsion syslt'ms for atlitoot' and vt'loc­
ilY chanjlt' mant'U\'t'rs. Mosl of Iht' consumabft's ust'd in tht' mission art' 
siort'd in Iht' S/M. Tht' SLA is a Iruncalt'd coot' which connt'cts tht' 
S/M 10 Ihe launch vt'hicit'. II also providt's Iht' spaCt' wht'rt'in tht' lunar 
modult' (LIM) is carrit'd on lunar missioos. 
TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME 0' ACCIDENT 
Spact'nafl 012 was undt'rgoing a "Plugs Oul Intt'gralt'd Tt'st" al the 
limt' of Iht' accidt'nl on January 27. 1967. Operational Cht'ckout Proct'· 
durt', dt'SiKnaled OCP .'O-K·OO21·1 applit'd to this tt'sl. Within this 
rt'porl Ihis proct'durt' is oftt'n rt'ft'rrt'd 10 as OCP·0021. 
TESTS AND ANAL YSES 
Rt'sults of tt'sts and analyst'S not complt'tt' al tht' timt' of publication 
of Ihis rt'porl "'iII he containt'din APJIt'ndix G. Addt'nda and Corrigenda. 
CONVERSION 0' TIME 
Throughout this ft'port. time is stalt'd in Grecnwich Mean Timt' (GKT). 
To convert GKT to Iastt'rn Standard Timt' (EST). subuact 17 hours. 
For nample. 2!l:~lJ GKT convt'ftt'd is 6:!lJ p.m. EST. 
For sale by the Superintendent or Doeuments, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Waahlngton. D.C. 20402 
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MEDICAL ANALYSIS PANEL 

A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 

The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Medical Analysis Panel, 11. The task assigned 
for accomplishment by Panel 11 was prescribed as follows: 
This panel is to provide a summary of medical facts together with appropriate medica:l analysis 
which would be of interest to the investigation. Examples would be cause of death, pathological e­
vidence of overpressure, and any other areas that might be of technical value in determining the cause 
of accident or in establishing corrective action. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Medical Analysis Panel: 
Dr. G. F. Kelly, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Dr. Alan C. Harter, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Dr. Norman W. Pincock, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Robert L. Spann, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Richard L. Thompson, Pan American Airways (PAA) 
Mr. Thomas H. Parish, David Clark Co. 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Langley Research Center (LaRC), NA SA, was assigned to monitor the 
Medical Analysis Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. NARRATIVE: 
In preparation for the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test, the crew had been examined 
and fitted with sensors prior to departing the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building (MSOB) at 
approximately 12:30 pm EST (17:30 GMT). After ingress, voice, bioinstrumentation data and certain 
environmental parameters were monitored at the aeromedical console in the blockhouse. In the Apollo 
204 spacecraft, only one crewman could be monitored at a time. During the course of the test, a 
switch in the cockpit was positioned at the request of the medical monitor so that data from each 
crewman could be monitored in tum. The Medical Data Acquisition System recorded data only from 
the Senior Pilot throughout the test. 
At the time of the accident, two NA SA physicians in· the blockhouse were monitoring data from 
the Senior Pilot. Upon hearing the first voice transmission indicating fire, the senior NASA physician 
turned from the biomedical console to look at the bank of television monitors. He could see on one 
what appeared to be flames coming from around the spacecraft but could not pick out a monitor 
which was focused on the hatch. When his attention returned to the console, the bioinstrumentation 
datl;\ had stopp~d. The biomedical engineer in the Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE) Control 
Room called the senior medical officer for instructions; was told to make the necessary alarms and informed 
that the senior medical officer was leaving his console at that time. The two NASA physicians were 
transported from the blockhouse to the base of the umbilical tower shortly before ambulances and 
the Pan American physician arrived. The Pan American log fixes the time of ambulance arrival at 
6:43 pm EST (23:43 GMT) (Reference 11.1). 
At this time considerable smoke was still rising from the White Room area. An estimate of the 
number of individuals who were working in the White Room was obtained, and the P an American 
physician was asked to make arrangements for the care of over 15 injured personnel. One of the 
injured who had proceeded to ground level was interviewed briefly as to the condition in the White 
Room and the Spacecraft. 
The two NA SA physicians and the Pan American physician then proceeded to the spacecraft. The 
time of arrival at the White Room on the 8th level is estimated at 6:45 pm EST (23:45 GMT). When 
the physicians first arrived, the hatches had been removed, the spacecraft was still smoldering, py. 
rotechnics had not been safetied and smoke was too thick to spend any time in the vicinity without 
a breathing apparatus. 
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After a quick evaluation, it was decided that nothing could be gained by attempting immediate 
egress and resuscitation. By this time, some 12 to 15 minutes had elapsed since the fire began. It 
was evident that the crew had not survived the heat, smoke, and thermal burns. . Conditions within 
the spacecraft (later confirmed by toxicological determinations) were such as to produce high levels 
of carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (C02), and other toxic gases and irritants. Also, oxygen 
was markedly depleted after the rupture of the spacecraft. IThese conditions would have necessitated 
institution of resuscitative measures within a very few minutes, since under optimal conditions, resus­
citation commenced more than four minutes after cardiac arrest is usually unrewarding. The three 
physicians then returned to ground level until adequate ventilation could be established. 
Shortly thereafter, they returned to the spacecraft with equipment for an attempted removal. After 
trying to remove the Senior Pilot by cutting his suit umbilicals and electrical connections, it became 
apparent that extensive fusion of the suits to molten nylon from the spacecraft would make removal 
very difficult. For this reason, it was decided to discontinue efforts at removal in the interest of ac­
cident investigation and attempt to get photographs of the spacecraft and relative positions of the crew­
men before evidence was disarranged. The two NASA physicians remained in the vicinity of the space­
craft while the Pan American physician returned to ground level. NA SA Security arranged for photo­
graphic coverage. 
After this was accomplished, one of the NA SA physicians returned to the blockhouse for approval 
to resume egress operations. Approval was received from Major General Samuel C. Phillips, U.S. 
Air Force/Apollo Program Manager, shortly after midnight, local time, and egress was begun at ap­
proximately 12:30 am EST (05:30 GMT), January 28, 1967. The Pan American Dispensary log in­
dicates that the ambulance with the Senior Pilot arrived at the Pan American Dispensary at 1:17 
am EST (06:16 GMT). The ambulance with the Command Pilot arrived at 1:35 am EST (06:35 
GMT) and the ambulance with the Pilot arrived at 2:08 am EST (07:08 GMT). Therefore, removal 
of the crew took approximately 90 minutes and was completed about seven and a half hours after 
the accident. The crewmen were removed to the Bioastronautics Operational Support Unit for post­
mortem examinations at 4:17 am EST (09:17 GMT). 
2. INVESTIGATION: 
Conclusions of the Medical Analysis Panel are based on evaluation of information obtained by the 
following procedures: 
a. Photographic Analysis: 

Numerous color and black and white photographs were obtained of: 

(1) The spacecraft and its interior prior to the removal of the crewmen. 
(2) The suited bodies after removal from spacecraft. 
(3) The suits, constant wear garments, and other crew equipment after removal. 
(4) Special post-mortem photographs. 
Photographs were studied in detail by the Panel and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 
investigators to correlate suit damage, position of bodies and pathological findings with fire propagation, 
sequence of events and cause of death. These photographs were made available to Members of the 
Board and other Panels as required. 
(Reference 11-2) 
b. Interrogation of Witnesses and Review of Records: 
One Panel member was at the blockhouse aeromedical console at· the time of the accident. Two 
members 'of the Panel participated in the removal of the crew from the spacecraft. Three Panel mem­
bers were present during desuiting and post-mortem examination. Other witnesses were interrogated 
as required. These included some of the smoke inhalation victims, several Pan American Airways 
medical personnel and members of the egress crew. 
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Also reviewed in detail were: 
(1) Witness statements 
(2) Pan American Airways, Cape Kennedy Medical Facility treatment records of smoke inhalation 
victims (Enclosure 11-1) 
(3) Complete Department of Defense (DOD) and NASA medical records of deceased crewmen 
(Reference 11· 3) 
(4) Pertinent findings of other Apollo 204 Review Board Panels. 
c. Biomedical and Communications Data Analysis: 
In order to coordinate voice and biomedical parameters with environmental measurements and estab­
lish sequence of events, the following procedures were perlormed in conjunction with Panel 3: 
(1) Blockhouse biomedical tapes and on-board Medical Data Acquisition System tapes from the 
Senior Pilot were analyzed in detail. The electrocardiogram (EKG): PHONOCARDIOGRAM 
(PKG) and impedance pneumogram (ZPN) records were studied at speeds of 10, 25, 50 and 
100 millimeters per second for indication of movement or change in physiological status. The 
EKG tracings were reproduced after passage through a 25, 35, and 100 cycles per second low­
pass filters. Audio transcriptions and graphic records of the terminal five minutes of the 
Senior Pilot's phonocardiographic data were recorded after passage through 100, 200, 300, 
400, 500, 750, and 1000 cycles per second low-pass filters. These were studied for evidence 
of voice communications and indications of movement. It is noted that physiological data 
were available only from the Senior Pilot. 
(2) Pertinent sections of voice transmissions from the spacecraft were studied with Bell Tele­
phone Laboratories personnel in both visual and auditory forms at various filter levels. 
d. Pathological Studies: 
At 11:00 am EST on January 28, 1967, gross examinations were commenced at the Bioastronautics 
Operational Support Unit located at Cape Kennedy Air Force Station. The autopsies were perlormed 
by the following personnel from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology: 
(1) Edward H. Johnston, Colonel, M.C., U.S. Army, Chief, Military Environmental Pathol­
ogy Division 
(2) CharlesJ. Stahl, Commander, M.C., U.S. Navy, Chief, Forensic Pathology Branch 
(3) Latimer E. Dunn, Captain, U.S. Air Force M.C., Chief, Aerospace Pathology Branch 
All Examinations included: 
(1) Survey of medical history 
(2) Examination of clothing 
(3) External examination 
(4) Appraisal of external evidence of injury 
(5) Internal examination 
(6) Microscopic examination 
(7) Radiographic examination 
(8) Toxicological examination for carbon monoxide saturation of lungs and venous blood, as 
well as blood from the kidney, li-'er, and muscle; cyanide in blood and lungs; lactic acid in brain; 
volatiles in liver and blood; acid, l '1ic and neutral drugs in liver; and spectrographic analysis of lungs 
for seven other gases and nine metallicons (Enclosure 11-2 and 11-3) 
e. -Toxicological Studies: 

Toxicological studies progressed along the following lines: 

(1) The quality of breathing oxygen supplied to the spacecraft before the fire was. reviewed 
from data collected during the countdown. Additional samples collected, as a result of the 
crew report of odors prior to the accident, were evaluated. 
(2) Attempts were made to determine cabin and suit environmental conditions from the time 
of onset of the fire until time of extinction. ' 
(3) An evaluation of the products of combustion when the available consumable materials were 
burned in this atmosphere was considered. The variety of such materials and the decompo­
sition variables of temperature, pressure and available oxygen condition preclude an accurate 
assessment of the conditions which existed at anyone time during the fire. 
(4) Environmental data recorded during the tests were reviewed to establish factors effecting 
environmental conditions. These parameters included suit flow, suit supply temperature, suit 
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differential pressure, compressor differential pressure, cabin pressure, surge tank pressure, com­
pressor inlet temperature, cabin temperature, carbon dioxide (C02) absorber outlet tempera­
ture and C02 partial pressure. 
(5) The Environmental Control Unit (ECU) was carefully inspected and residual samples were 
collected from the umbilical vent tubes and fittings. The samples were analyzed for in­
organic constituents. 
(6) Tests were performed to determine relative rates of carbon monoxide production from 
burning suit materials, polyurethane foam and activated charcoal in pure oxygen. (Ref­
erence 11-4) 
(7) Information regarding possible products of combustion were transmitted to the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology for use in conjunction with the toxicological studies performed as a part 
of the post-mortem examination. (Enclosure 11-4) 
(8) Other tests are in progress to determine the actual conditions for rapid heating of the 
C02 canisters. These tests should determine the potential of activated charcoal to provide 
a source of high carbon monoxide concentration into the suit loop. 
f. Suit Evaluation: 
A detailed visual and photographic examination of the suits was performed before desuiting in con­
junction with gorss pathological studies. All items of crew equipment were removed to a secure area 
and a detailed analysis of damage to this equipmCi.lt was performed by Flight Surgeons and suit spe­
cialists. This analysis included: 
(1) Detailed mapping of items of crew equipment which became detached from the suits during 
the course of the accident. 
(2) Photographic analysis. 
(3) Detailed mapping of damage to suits. 
(4) Examination of damaged metal fittings and suit material in conjunction with Panel 5. 
(5) Chemical analysis of various deposits for identification of toxic products of combustion. 
(Enclosure 11-4) 
g. Medical Analysis of Ground Emergency Procedures and Equipment: 
In connection with Panel 13, Ground Emergency Procedures and Equipment were reviewed from 
a medical viewpoint to evaluate their adequacy in this type of emergency. 
h. Medical Evaluation of In-Flight Emergency Procedures and Equipment: 
In connection with Panel 20, In-Flight Procedures and Equipment were reviewed from a medical 
viewpoint to evaluate their adequacy in event of an in-flight fire. 
i. Monitoring Capabilities 
A review of capabilities for monitoring biomedical and environmental parameters in the spacecraft 
was performed. This review included an evaluation of spacecraft telemetry capabilities and consoles 
used for safety monitoring of such ground tests as well as during flight. 
j. Environmental physiology: 
A review of pertinent environmental physiology relative to spacecraft cabin atmosphere was per­
formed. This review included a reexamination of physiological factors involved in the selection of a 
5 pounds per square inch, 100% oxygen (02) environment in Apollo, and the requirement for a com­
plete purge of cabin and sui~ circuit, prior to launch. This review was conducted in conjunction 
with the Director of Medical Research and Operations at Manned Spacecraft Center. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDING: 

All three crewmen were interviewed by a Medical Officer several hours prior to ingress. Proph­

yllactic penicillin was administered because of exposure to Beta hermolytic streptococcus. 

DETERMINATION: 

There 	was no medical condition and no drug administration which might be expected to degrade 

their normal performance. 

2. FINDING: 

Breathing oxygen supplied to the spacecraft before the frre was of adequate quality and quantity. 
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DETERMINATION: 

No anomalies in the suit atmosphere which could have adversely affected crew activities are evi­

denced from review of the data prior to the fire. 

3. FINDING: 

Biomedical data at the time of the accident were received from the Senior Pilot only and con­

sisted of one lead of EKG, as well as PKG, and impedance pneumogram (respiration). These 

data were received by telemetry and from the on-board Medical Data Acquisition System (MDAS). 

(Reference 11-5) 

DETERMINATION: 

This configuration was normal for the test. 

4. FINDING: 

At 6:30:22 pm EST (23:30:22 GMT) on the biomedical tape there is some change in the respi­

ration pattern and a moderate increase in the Senior Pilot's heart rate. 

DETERMINATION: 

This represents some increase in the Senior Pilot's activity, but does not indicate the degree of 

activity to be expected had he been aware of an emergency situation. 

5. FINDING: 

At 6:31:04 pm EST (23:31:04 GMT) on the biomedical tape there is a mar~ed change in the 

Senior Pilot's respiratory and heart rates. There is also evidence of muscle activity in the EKG 

tracing and evidence of motion in the PKG. The heart rate continues to climb until loss of signal. 

DETERMINATION: 

This physiological response is compatible with the realization of an emergency situation. (Ref­

erence 11-5) 

6. FINDING: 

Voice contact from the crew was maintained until 6:31:22.7 pm EST (23:31:22.7 GMT). 

DETERMINATION: 

At least one member of the crew was conscious until this time. 

7. FINDING: 

Hatches were opened at approximately 6:36 pm EST (23:36 GMT) and no signs of life were 

detected. Three physicians viewed the suited bodies at approximately 6:45 pm EST(23:45 GMT) 

and decided that resuscitation efforts would be to no avail. 

DETERMINATION: 

Time of death cannot be determined from this finding. 

8. FINDING: 

The Command Pilot's couch was in the 170-degree position. The foot restraints and harness 

were released. The inlet and outlet hoses were connected. The helmet visor was closed and locked. 

The electrical adapter cable was disconnected from the cobra cable. The Command Pilot was 

found lying supine on the aft bulkhead of the spacecraft with his helmet under the Pilot's head 

rest and his feet resting upon his own couch. P arts of his suit and items of crew equipment 

were found in various locations in the spacecraft, described in the suit evaluation. A fragment 

of the suit material was found outside the pressure vessel five feet from the point of rupture. 

(Reference 11-6). 

DETERMINATION: 

The Command Pilot had moved from his normal position after the onset of fire. The suit failed 

prior to rupture of the pressure vessel (the time of spacecraft rupture has been estimated by Panel 

5 to be 6:31:19 pm EST (23:31:19 GMT). 

9. FINDING: 

The Senior Pilot's couch was in the normal 96-degree position with the foot rest folded up against 

his lower couch. The head rest was up. The buckle releasing his shoulder straps and lap belts 

was not opened. (This strap configuration is normal for his emergency egress technique.) The 

straps were burned through. The suit outlet hose was connected but the inlet hose was discon­

nected. The helmet visor was closed and locked. All electrical connections were intact. The 

Senior Pilot was found lying on his left side, transversely across the spacecraft just below the level 

of the hatchway. 

DETERMINATION: 

The Senior Pilot did not leave his position until his restraining straps were burned through. He 

had moved from his normal position after the onset of fire. 
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10. FINDING: 

The Pilot's couch was in the 264-degree position. All restraints were disconnected, all hoses and 

electrical connections were intact. The helmet visor was closed and locked. The Pilot was found 

supine in his couch. 

DETERMINATION: 

There is no evidence that the Pilot moved from his normal posItIon after the start of the fire. 

This is consistent with the emergency egress procedure which calls for the Pilot to be the last 

to the leave the spacecraft. 

11. FINDING: 

The cause of death of the Apollo 204 Crew was as~yxia due to inhalation of toxic gases due 

to fire. Contributory cause of death was thermal burns. (Enclosures 11-3, 11-5, 11-6, and Ref­

erence 11-7) 

DETERMINATION: 

It may be concluded that death occurred rapidly and that unconsciousness preceded death by some 

increment of time. The fact that an equilibrium was not established throughout the circulatory 

system indicates that circulation of blood stopped rather abruptly before an equilibrium could 

be reached. 

12. FINDING: 

Panel 5 (Origin and Propagation of Fire) estimates that significant levels (over two percent) of 

carbon monoxide (CO) would be present in th~ spacecraft atmosphere by 6:31:30 pm EST (23:31:30 

GMT). By this time at least one suit had failed, introducing cabin gases to all suit loops. 

DETERMINATION: 

The crew was exposed to a lethal atmosphere when the first suit was breeched. 

13. FINDING: 

The Environmental Control System contains activated charcoal which, if heated, will produce 

CO. (Reference 11-11) 

DETERMINATION: 

It is the opinion of Panel 5 that heating of the C02 canister occurred late in the progress of 

the fire after significant levels of CO were already present in the cabin atmosphere, and after 

at least one suit had failed. 

14. FINDING: 

The distribution of CO in various organs indicates that circulation stopped rather abruptly when 

high levels of carboxyhemoglobin reached the heart (Enclosure 11-3). 

DETERMINATION: 

Loss of consciousness was due to cerebral hypoxia due to cardiac arrest, due to myocardial hy­

poxia. Factors of temperature, pressure and environmental concentrations of carbon monoxide, 

carbon dioxide, oxygen and pulmonary irritants were changing at extremely rapid rates. It is 

impossible to integrate these variables, on the basis of available information with the dynamic 

physiological and metabolic conditions they' produced in order to arrive at a precise statement 

of time when consciousness was lost and when death supervened. The combined effect of these 

environmental factors dramatically increased the lethal effect of any factor by itself. It is estimated 

that consciousness was lost between 15 and 30 seconds after the first suit failed. Chances of re­

suscitation decreased rapidly thereafter and were irrevocably lost within four minutes. 

15. FINDING: 

All three suits were breeched by fire to some degree. 

DETERMINATION: 

The suits were not capable of providing crew protection in a fire of this intensity. (Enclosure 

11-7 and Reference 11-6) 

16. FINDING: 

Suit damage increased progressively from the Command Pilot's side of the spacecraft to the Pi­

lot's side. 

DETERMINATION: 

The fire was most intense on the Command Pilot's side of the spacecraft. 

17. FINDING: 

The outer layer of all suits was considerably more damaged than the inner layer. 
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DETERMINATION: 

This lends support to the conclusion that the fire originated in the cabin rather than in 

the suit circuit. 

18. FINDING: 

In the Pilot's and Senior Pilot's suits, there is evidence of a path of fire damage from the failed 

areas coursing toward the suit outlet. In these areas, the fire damage is greater in the comfort 

liner and less in the outer layers of the suit. 

DETERMINATION: 

This tends to indicate that the compressor was still active for a period of time after the suit in­

tegrity failed. 

19. FINDING: 

An examination of the Senior Pilot's helmet reveals scorched and charred areas of the anterior 

portion of both earcups, charred portions of the passive radiation dosimeter situated near the left 

earcup, and evidence of fire damage on the anterior side of both microphone wires. 

DETERMINATION: 

The Senior Pilot's faceplate may have been open during a portion of the fire. 

20. FINDING: 

During continuity checks of the Command Pilot's communication and biomedical harness, some 

damage to the communication harness was found. (Enclosure 11-8). 

DETERMINATION: 

This damage is not considered as significant as a possible cause of the fire. 

21. FINDING: 

It was not possible from biomedical and environmental data to accurately construct a time line 

of environmental conditions or crew activities during this emergency. 

DETERMINATION: 

Available environmental and biomedical instrumentaion cannot be considered optimum for a po­

tentially hazardous test or for flight. 

22. FINDING: 

Medical examinations of the rescue personnel were made by the Pan American World Airways 

Dispensary. Breath analysis from the most severe victims of smok~ inhalation were negative for 

gases other than low concentrations of carbon monoxide. Urinalyses for beryllium and chest x­

rays were also negative in these men. (Enclosure 11-1) 

DETERMINATION: 

Medical records indicate that there were no permanent injuries to rescue personnel. 

r 23. FINDING: 
__-The purge with lOO-percent 02 at above sea-level pressure contributed to the propagation of fire 
in the Apollo 204 Spacecraft. 
DETERMINATION: 
This was the planned cabin environment for testing and launch, since prelaunch denitrogenation 
is necessary to forestall the possibility of bends at the mission ambient pressure of 5 pounds per 
square inch absolute. A comprehensive review of the operational and physiological ,trade-olfs of 
the various methods of denitrogenation is in progress. (Reference 11-9) 
24. FINDING: 

Rescue personnel were equipped with gas masks designed for protection against hypergolic vapors. 

They had no heat-protective garments. 

DETERMINATION: 

Rescue personnel were inadequately equipped for a fire-type rescue. 

E. SUPPORTING DATA 
This section contains support data to which references have been made in previous sections. These 
data are organized in numerical sequence as they appear in the written text. A table of contents 
for this section is as follows: 
ENCLOSURES 

11-1 Industriar' Injury Summary 

11-2 Post-Mortem Examination, Introduction 

11-3 Post-Mortem Examination, Toxicology 
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11-4 Thermal Degradation Products of Non-Metallic Materials 
11-5 Post-Mortem Protocol 
11-6 Post-Mortem Examination, Summary and Opinion 
11-7 Analysis of Suit Damage 
11-8 Continuity and Functional Tests of S/C-012 Crew Biomedical Equipment 
11-9 List of References 
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INDUSTR.IAL INJUR.Y SUMMAR.Y 
During rescue attempts following the Apollo-2Q4 accident on January 27, 1967, 27 persons were 
injured. Twenty-one of those injured were employed by North American Aviation Company, one by 
Pan American Aviation, and five were NASA employeeS. 
A majority of the injuries were smoke inhalation, contusions, and abrasions. Two of the injured 
were admitted to the PA A Dispensary overnight for observation and released the following morning. 
Others were treated and sent home. There was no evidence of permanent injury and no sequelae 
are expected. ' 
A record of these injuries are included in the Apollo-204 Review Board Medical Files at MSC. 
ENCLOSUR E 11 - 1 
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INTRODucrION 
During the late evening of 27 January 1967, The Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, 
Washington, D. C. wa.s alerted by National Aeronautics and Space Administration personnel that an 
accident had occurred aboard the Apollo spacecraft at Cape Kennedy, Florida resulting in the deaths 
of Lt. Colonel Virgil I. Grissom, USA F, Lt. Colonel Edward H. White. USAF, and Lt. Commander 
Roger B. Chaffee, USN. A request was later made the same evening for autopsy support and a team 
of three pathologists and a medical photographer (Colonel Edward H. Johnston. MC. USA. Commander 
Charles J. Stahl, MC, USN, Captain Latimer E. Dunn, USAF, MC, and TSgt Larry N. Hale, USAF) 
was sent to Cape Kennedy via special USAF plane. Facilities for the postmortem studies were made 
available by Colonel Frederick Frese. USAF. MC and his Deputy, Lt. Colonel Paul Hoffman. USAF, 
MC of the Bioastronautic Operational Support Unit. Following a general conference among Colonel 
Frese, Lt. Colonel Hoffman, Fred Kelly, M.D., NASA, Doctor Alan C. Harter, NASA, Doctor Freed­
land, NASA, and the AFIP team of pathologists, the detailed circumstances of the accident were dis­
cussed. The postmortem examinations were then started at 1100 hours, 28 January 1967, at the Bio­
astronautic Operational Support Unit. Following photographs and examination of the deceased still 
clothed in their space suits and helmets, the clothing was carefully removed under the general super­
vision of Doctor Fred Kelly and Doctor Alan Harter. All articles of clothing and personal effects were 
studied and then placed in separate duffle bags, labeled, locked and retained for examination by clothing 
experts designated by the Board of Inquiry. With the assistance of TSgt Freddie B. Moorehead, USAF 
X-ray Technician, Patrick AFB, total body x-rays were made of each body and the films examined 
prior to performing the internal examinations. Photographs of the front, back and specific areas of 
injury were made. A complete 'detailed description of the external body in each case was made by 
the pathologists. During the course of the autopsy, assistance was provided to the autopsy team by 
following USAF personnel who also served as witnesses to the examinations: 
Lt. Colonel Paul Hoffman, USA F, MC 

Major Pearl E. Tucker, USAF, NC 

Captain Dorothy Novotny, USAF, NC 

M/Sgt. Kenneth N. Springer, USAF 

A/1C Virginia Roberts, USAF 

The autopsies were completed at 0100 hours, 29 January 1967. A short conference was called 
by Doctor Fred Kelly in, which the pathologists were asked to assist in the preparation of the 
death certificate. 
E .. CLOSURE 11.:2 
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Chaffee, Roger B. 

AFIP Acceasion 1232463 

REPORT OF 'rOXICOLOGY 
CARBON ,..,NOXIDE 	 Lung - 697. sa:uration 

Blood - 1.5't .. 

Kidney - 224 " 

Brain - 37% .. 

Liver - 10% .. 

Muscle - 7% " 

Spleen - 57. .. 

CYA.'lIOE 	 Blood - 1 lII1:rogrM/lml 

Lung - 3 III1crogr••ISgm 

LACTIC ACID 	 'Brain - 151 ms't 
VOLATILES 	 Liver - 0 

Brain - 0 

Blood - 0 

DRUGS 
(ACid-Basic Neutral) 	 Liver - 0 
*O'rHER. GASES 	 LUNG (Normal lunS u.ed aa control 
was nogative for the.e ga••s) 
Acetylene - 40 1I01.es" 
Hydroge"l cyanide • 32 ., 
Fluoro-methane. 
-
14 " 
Fluoro-othanoll 2 " 
Hydrocarbon (unsaturated) 
..a3 butane 7 
..Methane 	 5 
LlIlIG (NoNAl lung u.ed a. contl'ol)**M&TALLIC IONS 
Lithium - within level of c~ntl'ation of control 
Selenium _ If 
Calcium " 
Zinc 
Manganese _ .. 
Lead " 
Chromium -	 " 
..Nickel 

BerylliUII - " 

• Examination by National Bureau of Standard. (ma8. spectrograph) 
** Examination by B~ochemi.try Division Walter leed A~IY Institute of aes..reh 
All other examination. by TOXicology stanch Armed loree. Institute 01 PathololY 
ENCLOSURE 11- 3 
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White. Edwa'l'd H. 

!FIP Accession 1232464 

REPORT OF TOXICOLOGY 
CARBON MONOXIDE 	 Lung • S8% saturation 

Blood • 381. " 

Kid~1.ey • 441. It 

lIraln - 181 " 

Liver • 27'%. .. 

Muscle _ 221. u 

C'iA..'Ul)E 	 Blood - 2 microsrams/3 1111 

Lung - 3 micrograms IS sa 

Braln • 183 mgtLACUC ACID 
Liver - 0 
3ra:ln • 0 
Blood - 0 
VOLATILES 
DRUGS 
(Acid • Baaic - Neutral) 	 Liver - 0 
LUNG (Normal luna used as control
"'OTHER GASES ~as nesativ. for th••e aaS8S) 
Acetylene - 22 1IIOle~ 
Hydrogen cyanide - 16 It 
Fluaro-mothane. 5 It 
1 ItFluoro-ethanes 
Hydrocarbon (unsaturated) 
as butane 2 " 
Matha=-e - 54 " 
LIING (No'l'lll3l luna u.ed as control)**METALLIC IONS 
LithiU1ll - within range of normal control 
SeleniU1ll _ slightly above control. but in 'l'anse of normal 
Calcium - within rang~ of normal control 
Zinc " Manganese - II 
Lead " 
ChrOllliU1ll 
-
" 
Nickel 
..B8rjlUuIII ­
*Examination by National Bureau of Standa4~s (ma,s seectrograph) 
**Examination by Biochemistry Division-Walter leed.Ar.y Institute of Ie."'l'ch 
All other examinations by Toxicology-Branch-Armed rorc•• In.titute of PatholoSY 
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Cri••oa. Virail 1. 
AFI. Acc••sion 1232462 
REPORT OF TOXICOLOGY 
Lung • SSt .aturationCARBON N>NO''{IDE 
lHood - 4'" .. 
Kidney - 371 .. 
Brain. - 2O'J. .. 
Liver - 201 .. 
Muscl. - 17'1. .. 
Blood - 3 aicroar.../3 alCYANIDE Lung - 2 aicr08r.../5 .. 
Brain - 163 ag'l.LACTIC ACID 
Liver - 0VOLATILES 8rai'ft - 0 
Blood - 0 
Dr.:IGS Liver - 0(Acid - BasiC - Neutral) 

WNG (lIozaal 1lI111 u... a. control

*Ol'HEft GASES 
vas fteaati.a for th... • ••••) 
Ace:;ylene 31) _1••'1. 
Hydrogen cyanide 
- 211 • 
Fluoro-methanu - 10 " 
2 ItF1uoro-.a.tJa.a;a.u 7 ..Hydrocarbon (unaaturated)­
u butane 

..Metbane - lJ 
LUNG (liozaal lUDI u." •• control)
**HE'CALLIC IONS 
LithiUIII - within level of control 
SeleniulII _ .lightly elrlated above control. but in ranee of 'ftozaal 
Calc1U111 _ within level of control
..
Zinc 
..
Mangane.. • 
..
Lead 
..ChromiUIII 
­Nickel II 
Beryllium _ .. 
*BXAmlnation by National Bureau of Standards (.a•• eR!ctroartlh) 
**Ex8lllin.ation by Biochemistry Division Walt.r .... knt1 In.titut. of .....t'Ch 
All otber examinationa by Toxicology Bran.cb Ar.ed Fot'C•• In.titut. of Patholo., 
261-109 0 - 67 - 3 D-11-17 
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TO 
nOM 
.."...... .........
--­
........ c. ...}....ty: 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
Memorandum 
HUI/Dr. F. Kelly 
DB/Chief, Biomedical Research Office 
DAft: FEB 23 1967 
In reply refer to: 
DB24/02/005 
IUBJBct: Thermal degradation products of nonmetalllc _terials 
........ 
An analysis of nonmetallic materials in the suit loop and cabin results 
in a breakdown into several generic groups. Individual me.tenals are 
too highly variable to obtain specific, reproducible degradation products. 
Ultimately. all hydrocarbons would be e.xpected to produce CO2 and H20 in 
an excess of O2 and high temperatures. However, the followiiig caapounds 
and classes can be expected to result fram the uncontrolled thermal 
degradation of the nonmetallics: 
a. Carbon monoxide. 
b. Homologous aldehydes from formaldeh;yde and acetaldeh;yde upward. 
c. Organic acids of all types. 
d. Organotins as catalysts and preservatives in a variety of 
plastics. 
e. Virtually every known solvent. 
f. Methane. 
ACRYLICS (various type s ) 
Methyl alcohol 
Acrylic acid 
Methyl methacrylate 
C4-C6 oxygenated compounds 
Isobutylene 
Methacrylic acid 
DACRON (als~ lttYlar) 
Terephthalic acid and more complex chain ~ts 
Acetaldehyde 
Methane 
Ethane 
Benzene 
2-Methyl dioxolane 
Enclosure 11-4 
ENCLOSliRE 11.4 
0-11-19 
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SILICONES 
Too many and too complex to analyze - primarily methane, benzene, 
methyl silanols, and siloxanes 
POLYETHYIENE, POLYPROPYIENE 
Ethylene 

Propylene 

POLYVINYL CHIDRIDE 
Hydrochloric acid 
TEFIDN 
Tetrafluoroethylene 

Assorted fluorinated hydrocarbons 

Fluorophosgene 

Octa fluoroisobutylene 

Hydrofluoric acid 

POLYVINYL ACETATE 
Acetic acid 
NEOPRENE 
Hydrochloric acid 
RUBBER 
Oxides of sulphur 

Isoprene 

Dipentene 

p-Menthene 

PHENOLICS 
Fonnaldebyde 

Formic Acid 

Benzene 

Phenol 

Propanol 

Methane 

Acetylene 

Ammonia 

Toluene 

Oxides of nitrogen 

D-11-20 
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POLYCARBONATE 
No information 
NYLON (including Nomex, Velcro) 
Hydrogen cyanide 

Cyclopentanone 

Ammonia 

Aldehydes 

Adipamide 

Oxides of nitrogen 

POLYURETHANE 
Hydrogen cyanide 
Halogenated hydrocarbons, HCl and HF from foaming treons 
Oxides of nitrogen 
Organic tins 
Toluene 2, 4-diisocynates 
EPOXYS 
Ammonia 

Methane 

Benzene 

Propylene 

Acetone 

Acetaldehyde 

Dipropyl ether 

DB24:ESHarris:jb 2/21/67 
Lawrence F. Dietlein, M.D. 
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Q.AT~ ANO WOU~ ~O' 
27 Ja".",,;rx 1967 
......=_ C~.ar1es J. 
Co","",,,de t: 
CAUSE g: p'!:ATRl ASFd'CXlA O'JE TO nlF.....UTION 0'1 TOXIC gc.SE,S DUE 'to .ElY. 
co~II.'t:&:TO!'x CAUSE g: D'!:AIii' TRERl-l'1.L IltRNS 
~:'>.)''!/J::1t g: DEA.'J;d, ACCIOE!!TA'L 
MTHOI.OOiCAk ~ 
1. ASl'".raIA DUE TO IlIBIJ..A,TI03 0'1 'tOXIC CASES D:lIi: 'to FIlII, lWIIJES'nD Ble: 
a. callON MONOXID! POISo:mIG. 
b. SOOT WI'.t!l.IN NOSE, ORAL CAVITI', Tl!tA.ClIEA A!<.1) UO:iC!iI. 
c. l!E.."IOIWIAGIC lr.JlMOlIAlIY El)::l'lA., DIFFUSE. 
2.. TREl\.'!.\L lI:JlI!iS, 1ST, 2ND Ali]) 3Rll DZGUE. ESToo:E£D 60'1. TO'l'A'L BOIl'! SllBFACE AI.IIA., 
as follows, 
lSI: and 2t.d Degr.. : Eat::!.mAt:ed 2"'1:. 1:Oul body surface au&. 
3rd D"graa: En:!.mAl:ad 36'%. 1:01:81 body surface area. 
~ISSO}I.. Virgll lvae. 
1.1eut_U"l; Colonel. Uu1ud Statu Air Force 
~4 Force. Institute ot lathology 
'fuM.ng1:OtI.. D. C, 20.305 
ENCLOSURE 11-5 
D-11-23 
S;.. f.J .. ~.;' 7-»wl. 'SuS 
;"':~"~~';: AI.'::"st ';>.)<: 
S\:;I..61. olr d.<: S~;d 
C.t<I.:..=A-HIRe,'.) 
~LI!l£!A l!\l.~ '£Q !~~Ii\..!rQ.!! .Q~ !Qli!£ QMg,11 ~ 1Q. !m, ~~m.l1!~ llY: 
a. CA-a.!l_01!..l!.0~..1:!!.C~l..0...I.§.o...'!.I"",!G~. 
b. SOOT WITHIN NOSE, 0l!.Al. c;..VIT'f, TRACflEA AND lIROllCHI. 
c. HEMOll.RliAGiC PllUIONARY ,€Dii:l-L4., DIFFUSE 
2. Tl'.Elt.'1.4.L BUll-liS, 1ST, 2ND and 3RD llEGREE, '€S'ID!A.TlID 48% TOTAL BODY SIJRPACI AlU':A, 
as £01101<5: 
1ST and 2ND Dagrea: Estimated at ,otal body surface area. 
3Rd Dagree: Estimated 401. total body surface a~ea. 
4TH Degree: None. 
(Continued) 
~ed lorce. Institute of Pathology 
Wa.h1ngton. D. C. 20305 
For~e 
D-11-24 
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~1"'H::"fO !,~I;I; iOJ 
1.e\·_oJ ....\O.."""t.9H 
f!.u:,,;... of::A Sud.;': 
c;:~:.;.' ..... n(AH.) 
OAT£: ANO HO...;' o:m ~, : lM.'tJ; ~.":;) XQl.oft AI..":g:-;-r ..;UOR:.t;%) A.. Mol C:HIiCK ON& 
27 J&'''ruA..llY 1967 ","'.1 27 JAN 1967 - 1100 ERSI:.M. j ......tnQHY I MIAI-'T 
PRCL:iCTQ1I I....::;I&T,.,..... I I 
L. :::. Dm.~, CAn, USAF, Me C. J. STARL, CDR, };C, t'S:-I x , 
~,,==- E. H. JOHNSTON, COL, He, OSA 
A. 	 CAUSE OF DEATH: 
AS?I!YXIA, DUE: :to INliAUTION OF TOXIC GASES, DUE TO !:!!!£. 
CO~I1IOTORY CAUSE OF DEATH: 
THERMAL BORNS DUli: :to .E1:!!:!. 

~'J.'NSR OF DEATH: 

ACCID!NTAL 
1. 	 ASl!'lmtIA. DUli: TO INlIALA..'"IOli OF TOXIC GASES, D'Jli: TO FIU lWIIiEStEl) BY; 
(a) CAlUION MJNQXIDZ ?OISONING 
(b) SOC:t WITHIN THE MOll'IlI, NA..~S, AND TlW:HEOIliONCBUI. tIIEI 
(c) I!EMOIWIAGIC P'IlI.Y.ONARY EDEMA., DIFFUSE 
2 • 	 TII!RMAL BORNS: 
(a) FIRST AND SECOND DEGltEE • ESTIMA:tED AS 6t OF BODY StlUACE 
(b) THmD DEGREE • ESTL'!A.TED AS 23t OF BODY SlJUACE 
(c) FOllRl'l! DEGltEE - NOM!: 
3. 	 OLD DrJOll.Y OF 7TH THOl!ACIC VEaTURA. CONSISTl!b.'l' WITH 0Ll) COlaUSSIO!I 

Fl!AC'XtlU • 

ClIAFFHE. lloier 11. 
AUTOm ftOTOCOL
.LiaueaDAne ~... lJn1ea4 su.eas Navy 	
--­
Armed Porea. IDae1euea of ~aeholol1 ­
Wa.h1n&toll, D. C. 20305 
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Grissom, Virgil I. 

AFIP Accession 1232462 

SUMMAR Y AND OPINION 
During the evening of 27 January 1967, a fire occurred within the Apollo-Sautrn 204 Test Vehicle 
on Pad 34 at U.S. Air Force Station, Cape Kennedy, Florida. The primary team of astronauts for 
the Apollo project, Lieutenant Colonel Virgil I. Grissom, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. White 
USAF, and Lieutenant Commander Roger B. Chaffee, USN, died as the result of the fire. 
The post-mortem examination and toxicological studies of Lieutenant Colonel Grissom indicate 
that carbon monoxide poisoning is the most significant finding. Active inhalation of smoke and pro­
ducts of combustion in the form of acetylene, hydrogen cyanide, fluoro-methanes, fluoro-ethanes and 
other toxic gases were detected by mass spectrographic analysis of the lungs. There was evidence of 
early post-mortem change in the skin and internal organs, and the presence of methane in the lung 
may have resulted from either post-mortem decomposition or inhalation of products of combustion, 
or both. 
Thermal burns, estimated as 60% total body surface area (36% third degree), are considered as a 
contributory cause of death. Burns involging this percentage of the total body surface are usually 
not immediately fatal. It is not possible to state that all of the thermal burns are antemortem. 
The distribution of carbon monoxide in the various tissues provides an evaluation of the saturation 
of blood in these organs by carbon monoxide. The sample of blood obtained for analysis is a mix­
ture of venous and arterial blood from the inferior vena cava and both sides of the heart. The dis­
tribution studies of the tissues for carbon monoxide indicate that an equilibrium between the carbon 
monoxide and blood had not occurred in all areas of the body. These studies alone are consistent 
with a rapid death. 
Rapid depletion of oxygen by fire within the, closed environment, the formation and absorption of 
carbon monoxide gas, and the liberation and inhalation of other toxic products of combustion, associ­
ated with a rapid increase in the pressure and temperature within the capsule, resulted in a state of 
severe hypoxia, or even complete anoxia, which explains a rapid death. With the information obtained 
from the autopsy and the toxicological findings it is not possible to determine the exact time of death. 
Results of analysis of air samples from within the capsule at the time of the fire are not available for 
correlation with the post-mortem findings. 
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White,_Edward H. 

AFIP Accession 1232464 

SUMMARY AND OPINION 
During the evening of 27 January 1967, a fire occurred within the Apollo-Saturn 204 Test Vehicle 
on Pad 34 at U.S. Air Force Station, Cape Kennedy, Florida. The primary team of astronauts for 
the Apollo Project, Lieutenant Colonel Virgil I. Grissom, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. White, 
USAF, and Lieutenant Commander Roger B. Chaffee, USN, died as the result of the fire. 
The post-mortem examination and toxicological and studies of Lieutenant Colonel White indicate 
that carbon monoxide poisoning is the most significant finding. Active inhalation of smoke and products 
of combustion prior to death is confirmed by the presence of soot within the tracheobronchial tree. 
Products of combustion in the form of acetylene, hydrogen cyanide, fluoro-methanes, fluoro-ethanes 
and other toxic gases were detected by mass spectrographic analysis of the lungs. There is evidence 
of early post-mortem change in the skin and internal organs, and the presence of methane in the lung 
may have resulted from either post-mortem decomposition or inhalation of products of combustion, 
or both. 
Thermal burns, estimated as 48% total body surface area, (40% third degree) are considered as 
a contributory cause of death. Burns involving this percentage of the total body surface are not im­
mediately fatal. It is not possible to state that all of the thermal burns are antemortem. 
The distribution of carbon monoxide in the various tissues provides an evaluation of the saturation 
of blood in these organs by carbon monoxide. The sample of blood obtained for analysis is a mix­
ture of venous and arterial blood from the inferior vena cava and both sides of the heart. The dis­
tribution studies of the tissues for carbon monoxide indicate that an equilibrium between the carbon 
monoxide and blood had not occurred in all areas of the body. These studies alone are consistent 
with a rapid death. 
Rapid depletion of oxygen by fire within the closed environment, the formation and absorption of 
carbon monoxide gas, and the liberation and inhalation of other toxic products of combustion associated 
with a rapid increase in the pressure and temperature within the capsule resulted in a state of severe 
hypoxia or even complete anoxia which explains a very rapid death. With the information obtained 
from the autopsy and the toxicological findings it is not possible to determine the exact time of death. 
Results of analysis of air samples from within the capsule at the time of the fire are not available 
for correlation with the post-mortem findings. 
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Chaffee, Roger B. 

AFIP Accession 1232463 

SUMMARY AND OPINION 
During the evening of 27 January 1967, a fire occurred within the Apollo-Saturn 204 Test Vehicle 
on Pad 34 at U.S. Air Force Station, Cape Kennedy, Florida. The primary team of astronauts for 
the Apollo Project, Lieutenant Colonel Virgil!. Grissom, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. White, 
USAF, and Lieutenant Commander Roger B. Chaffee, USN, died as the result of the fire. 
The post-mortem examination and toxicological studies of Lieutenant Commander Chaffee indicate 
that carboIt monoxide poisoning is the most significant finding. Active inhalation of smoke and pro­
ducts of combustion prior to death is confirmed by the presence of soot within the tracheobronchial 
tree. Products of combustion in the form of acetylene, hydrogen cyanide, fluoro-methanes, fluoro­
ethanes and other toxic gases were detected by mass spectrographic analysis of the lungs. There was 
evidence of early post-mortem change in the skin and internal organs, and· the presence of methane in 
the lung may have resulted from either post-mortem decomposition or inhalation of products of com­
bustion or both. 
Thermal burns, estimated as 29% total body surface area (23% third degree), are considered as a 
contributory cause of death. Burns involving this percentage of the total body surface are usually 
not immediately fatal. It is not possible to state that all of the thermal burns are antemortem. 
The distribution of carbon monoxide in the various tissues provides an evaluation of the satura­
tion of blood in these organs by carbon monoxide. The sample of bl()ocl obtained for analysis is a 
mixture of venous and arterial blood from the inferior vena cava and both sides of the heart. The distri­
bution studies of the tissues for carbon monoxide indicate that an equilibrium between the carbon 
monoxide and blood had not occurred in all areas of the body. These studies alone are consistent 
with a rapid death. 
Rapid depletion of oxygen by fire within t~e closed environment, the formation and absorption of 
carbon monoxide gas, and the liberation and inhalation of other toxic products of combustion, as­
sociated with a rapid increase in the pressure and temperature within the capsule, resulted in a state 
of severe hypoxia, or even complete anoxia, which explains a rapid death. With the information ob­
tained from the autopsy and the toxicological findings it is not possible to detennine the exact time of 
death. Results of analysis of air samples from within the capsule at the time of the fire are not avail­
able for correlation with the post-mortem findings. 
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APOLLO. 204 SUITS, ANALYSIS OF DAMAGE 

ENCLOSURE 11 ·7 
D-11-31 
1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this report is to record the damage to the Space Suit Assemblies and associated 
personal equipment worn on board Apollo-204 at the time of the accident on January 27, 1967. A 
secondary purpose is to set forth observations recorded during the survey which may add useful In­
formation concerning origin and path of the fire and lead to recommendations and conclusions for 
future design 
2. INTRODUCTION 
~he survey was conducted during the period February 14 through February 28, 1967 at Ken­
nedy Space Center, Florida, Pyrotechnics Installation Building (PIB), Room 106. The equipment had 
been brought to the location from the Bioastronautics Building, Cape Kennedy, after removal of the 
crewmen. The equipment had been impounded in Room 106 of the PIB and placed under direct con­
trol of Panel 11 Medical Analysis. 
Also included, but laid out separately, was the constant wear garments with attached bioinstru­
mentation, short lengths of the Environmental Control System (ECS) umbilicals with nozzles for the 
Command Pilot and Senior Pilot, and still attached space suit cobra electrical adapters. 
3. SCOPE 
The survey was conducted during the period February 14, 1967 through February 28, 1967 at 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida, Pyrotechnics Installation Building (PIB), Room 106. The equipment 
had been brought to the location from the Bioastronautics Building, Cape Kennedy, after removal 
of the crewmen. The equipment had been impounded in Room 106 of the PIB and placed und"f 
direct control of Panel 11 Medical Analysis. 
A thorough inspection was also made of the spacecraft removed components (couches, struts, back 
pans, electrical cables, ECS umbilicals, etc) and the spacecraft interior to identify and account for mis­
sing items. All items found on the couches and back pans were photographed in place, removed, 
and transferred by Test Preparation Sheet (TPS) to the space suit inspection area in Room 106, PIB. 
A total of eighteen (18) samples of deposits and materials of interesting condition and location were 
removed from the space suits (e.g. inlet and outlet connectors and nozzles, ECS umbilical interiors, 
helmet areas, and certain soft goods areas) and transferred to the Kennedy Space Center Materials 
Analysis Branch for analysis. 
Electrical equipment was inspected on location by the Fire Panel and then removed to the Materials 
Analysis Branch for closer inspection and documentary photographs. Since there was evidence of possible 
pin burning at the pin interface between the cobra cable adapter and the cohra cable 37 pin connector 
on the Command Pilot suit (which was found disconnected at this joint), the connection between this 
adapter and the space suit 61 pin connector was not broken but was removt;d intact from the space 
suit (flange included) for electrical continuity and functional checks. Arrangements were made to have 
continuity and functional checks of all electrical components (e.g. helmet communications, biocommun­
ication harness, bioinstrumentation belt components, and space suit cobra cable adapters). Prior to 
removal of samples, a complete photographic survey was made of the space suit components including 
close-ups of pertinent areas in stereo as well as regular color film. 
4. BACKGROUND 
a. Space Suit Configuration Description 
The Apollo Block I Space Suit Assembly, Part Number S-987-000, NASA designation type A-IC, 
is basically identical to the Gemini G-4C space suit used in the Gemini-Titan 4,5,6,8,9,10,11, and 
12 flights. The complete space suit assembly is described in detail in DCM-999A-019-00 CEI De­
tailed Specifications for the Apollo Block I Space Suit Assembly. 
D-11-32 
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Specific part numbers of all components used in the assemblies aboard Apollo .204, together with 
inspection and utilization data packages, are set forth in the individual log books for these space suit 
assemblies (located in Room 3343, MSOB). 
The serial number designations of the space suits (and respective log books)used were: 
(1) Command Pilot: A-IC-16 
(2) Senior Pilot: A-IC-17 
(3) Pilot: A-IC-17 
For parts descriptions and drawing numbers of the Apollo-204 suit configuration, see Reference 
An additional more detailed description including sketches and photographic documentation, is 
available in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Manned Spacecraft Center Medical 
Files in Houston. 
b. Pilot Accessories 
The space suits provide accommodations for much of the pilot's personal equipment, primarily 
in any array of pockets attached to the outer coverlayer. The equipment carried on board Apollo 
204 is listed below: 
ITEM 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
PART NUMBER 
SEB 4010000095·201 
A-U93-000 
A·1193·000 
ACS 1505 
SEB 12100029-201 
SEB ·12100030-201 
SEB 12100033·201 
EC 30045 
EC 20541 
RFB·OP·4·3·003 
SEB 12100031·001 
SEB 12100032·202 
PART NAME 
Life Vest Ass'y 
Neck Seals 
(Water Egress) 
Neck Seal 
(Ventilation) 
Wrist Dams 
Chronograph 
Wrist Watcloles 
with Velcro 
band 
Sunglasses (In 
Nylon Pouch) 
Combination 
Knife (with 
lanyard) 
Shroud Cutter 
(with lanyard) 
Pocket Dosimeter 
Marking Pens 
Mechanical 
Pencils 
LOCATION/NO. PER CREWMAN 
One set of 2 for each crewman attached 
by harness at each armpit. 
One each, upper right arm pocket 
One each, any leg pocket 
Two each, upper left arm pocket 
One each, left wrist below suit pres· 
sure indicator 
One each, left lower leg pocket 
One each, Command" Pilot and Pilot, 
Outboard lower right leg 
One, Senior Pilot only 
One, Senior Pilot only, Inboard Left leg 
Two each, one in left leg inboard pencil 
pocket, one in upper left arm pocket 
Two each, upper left arm pocket 
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(12) EC 30190 
(13) CSD 20:>42 
(14) EC 30115 
(15) ~/A 
(16) RFB·OP·4·3·002 
(17) 14·0105 
(18) 
103120 
Phonocardiogram 104119 
sig. condo 103020 
(19) A 1912-003 
c. VENTILATION SYSTEM 
;\pollo Scis.sors 
(with lanyard) 
Cemini Scissors 
(Wilh lanyard) 
Penlight 
~ylon Glove 
Liners 
Passive Radiation 
Dosimeters 
Urine Collection 
Device 
Biocommunication 
Harness (with 61 
Pin Connect­
Bioinstrumenta tion 
Package 
(a) Signal VCondi­
tioners 
(a) Signal Condi­
tioners 
(b) Wire Harness 
(c) Sensors 
Constant Wear 
Garment 
One each. Senior Pilot and Pilot, in­
board lower right leg 
One-Command Pilot Only, inboard, lower 
right leg 
One each, inboard lower right leg pen­
light pocket 
Two each, worn on hands inside pres­
sure gloves 
One set of four each: 
(a) In helmet at left of eye 
(b) In Constant Wear Garment at right 
chest 
(c) In CWG at inside left thigh 
(d) In CWG at inside right calf 
Worn on crewman @ pelvic area 
One each worn inside suit at chest with 
61 Pin connector secured to Bio Flange 
(a) Four 	 each worn in pockets of CWG 
bio belt at abdomen 
(b) Connected 	 at lower end of Sigrtal 
Conditioners 
(c) Four, Senior Pilot only 
One each, color coded: 
(a) Command Pilot-Red 
(b) Senior Pilot-White 
(c) Pilot-Blue 
For purposes of clarification and to aid in the visualization of the damage description of the space 
suit ventilation system, the following description of the ventiliation system is offered as a reference guide. 
The ventilation system consists of a network of individual tubes -which' extend from a common 
manifold at the inlet ventilation connector (blue) to the arms, legs, helmet, and waist which carry 
a fresh supply of ventilation or pressurization oxygen from the Spacecraft ECS hoses to provide metabolic 
requirements for body cooling, breathing oxygen, and C02 removaL The flow exits at the bottom 
of the feet, the wrists, the scalp, across the face,. and at the back waist. The flow is approximately 
divided as follows: 
(1) Helmet: 35% 
(2) Each leg: 15% (30% total) 
(3) Each Arm: 15% (30% total) 
(4) Waist: 5% 
After exhausting from the ventilation channel ends, the flow returns across the body, exiting at 
the exhaust ventilation connector (red), and into the outlet ECS umbilical. The routing of the venti­
lation tube is as follows (all starting at the inlet manifold at the left abdomen area): 
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(1) To helmet; three double tubes up center of chest to connections at the neck ring sides and 
front center. 
(2) To arms; one double tube each, up and across chest to armpits, across front of arm, to lateral 
surfaces of arm splitting into two single tubes above and behind the elbow and then running down each 
side of the forearm to the wrist connector. 
(3) To legs; two quadruple tubes each running across abdomen to outside of legs splitting into 
two double tubes above the knee which continue down the side of the legs to the boot ventilation pads. 
(4) To torso; one double tube around left side of waist to center back. 
d. TORSO 
The majority of the suit described in this damage assessment is the basic four layer soft goods 
anthropomorphous body covering encompassing the arms, legs, feet, and trunk, and including all major 
subassell)blies\such as glove connectors, helmet connectors, and ventilation system and fittings. Also 
considered are the Constant Wear Garment, Helmet, Gloves and Electrical Systems. 
The torso layer is as follows: 
(1) Outer Cover Layer: White, 6 oz. Oxford Weave HT-1 (Nomex) Nylon; 
(2) Restraint Layer: Link net, HT~1 Nylon Cord 
(3) Gas Container: Neoprene Coated Nylon Cloth 
(4) Inner Liner: Blue, 3 oz. Oxford Weave Nylon Cloth 
The cotton Constant Wear Garment is worn immediately under the inner liner. 
5. INITIAL CONFIGURATION (before crew removal from Spacecraft) 
a. Command Pilot: Suit Assembly Designation, A-IC-16 
The ventilation hose nozzles were engaged with the suit connectors and the connectors in locked 
position. The Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA) electrical adapter "{as connected to the 61 pin 
space suit electrical connector but was disconnected at the cobra cable end (37 pin male); The helmet 
was installed and properly locked with the visor down and bailer bar fully locked. The gloves were 
i.nJtalled and locked and entry closure assembly (pressure sealing zipper) was fully closed. 
, 
The ventilation umbilicals were cut 37 1/2 inches above the nozzle and removed still engaged 
with the suit. 
b. Senior Pilot: Assembly Designation, A-IC-17 
Outlet ventilation hose nozzle connected and connector in locked position. The inlet ventilation 
hose noiile "was .disconnected and connector in the unlocked position. The PGA electrical adapter 
was connected to the space suit electrical connector and to the cobra cable connector (through the 
two stages of electronic adapters). This adapter cable had been cut through 6 in. above suit connector 
to allow crewman removal. The helmet was installed and properly locked with the visor down and 
the bailer bar fully locked. The gloves were properly installed and locked .and the entry closure 
assembly (pressure sealing zipper) was fully dosed. 
The ventilation umbilicals were cut 18 in. above the nozzle and removed with the suit (outlet 
nozzle still connected). 
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c. Pilot: Assembly Designation, A-IC-IS 
The configuration was identical to the Command Pilot's described above except that the PGA 
electrical adapter was connected to the cobra cable. This was subsequently disconnected at the cobra 
cable to allow crewman removal from the Spa~craft. The ventilation hose nozzles were disengaged 
from the suit to allow crewman removal from the Spacecraft. 
6. DAMAGE DESCRIPTIONIOBSERVATION 
a. Torao 
The most severe damage was incurred at the Command Pilot's suit (70 percent destroyed)" while 
the Senior Pilot's suit was moderately damaged (25 percent destroyed) and the Pilot's suit waa the 
least damaged (15 percent destroyed). 
The heaviest damage to the Command Pilot's suit was over the legs, right arm, and over the 
anterior truIl\k from chest to the upper abdomen. 
The heaviest damage to the Senior Pilot's suit occurred over the left arm, left leg, left side of 
trunk extending across mid abdomen, and right knee. . 
The Pilot's suit shows damage along the lateral aspects of both arms, discrete areas on the poIterior 
aapects of both shoulders, the anterior portions of the lower right leg, and at the back of the neck. 
The survival of areas with heavy seams was more apparent here, indicating less direct flame impinge­
ment to this suit than the other two. The greater percentage of coverlayer remaining indicated far 
leu expoiure to intense heat than the other two crewmen. 
The damage patterns to the space suit assemblies indicated an external heat source. The external 
layer was the most severely damaged and the inner layer was the least damaged. Thus as the suits 
were qualitatively examined. a greater percentage of each individual layer remained as the examination 
progressed inward. 
An observation which recurred often during the examination was that materials which were sllidded 
from the flame path by the suits relative position, or by external material layers, generally survived 
relatively intact. This is especially true in areas of heavy seam construction, some areas and acces­
IOries covere~ by pockets, and webbing. It was also noticed that materials adjacent to hardware and 
layer build-ups of relatively high mass (e.g. neck ring, wrist ring, and ventilation connector flanges; 
and areu at the leg cuffs, wrist cuffs, and arourid the entry closure) escaped with moderate damage 
while IUI'"rounding areas were consumed. 
In nearly all cases the bum damage for any sublayer followed an almost identical pattern to the 
damace of the next outermost layer, except that the damage was less, and more material remained, 
indicating partial protection from the preceding outer layer. 
The Constant Wear Garment, on a percentage basis, showed less overall damage than any other 
suit layer. The damage area generally matched corresponding damage areas in the immediately pre­
eedint mit layer but the damage was not as severe. 
b. Ventilation System-This system is indicated in detail in Section 4 c. 
In general the major portion of the ventilation tubing systems remained intact. About 75 percent of 
the Command Pilot's system, and 90 percent each of the Senior ~ilot's and Pilot's systems were un· 
damaged. The ventilation tubes were penetrated at various places, apparently by external heat 
aources or direct flame impingement from adjacent'materials or Spacecraft ambient circulation. This 
is indicated because most tube penetrations correspond in location to external penetrations of space 
mit layers between the tube surface and the cabin ambient. In many cases only the side of the tube 
ex:poIed to the highest indicated heat source is burned away leaving the side away from the heat lOurce 
intact. There is no evidence of an internal source of combustion causing rupture from the iDlide. 
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Examination of the interior of the Pilot's and Senior Pilot's ventilation tubes found them clean with 
little evidence of soot. The inlet manifolds of these two suits were perfectly intact showing no damage 
and little exposure to elevated temperatures, demonstrating that no appreciable heat or smoke was 
being introduced into the suit from the ECS system. The damage source and path determination of 
the Command Pilot's ventilation system is more difficult because of the destruction of the suit at the 
torso front. The inlet manifold section was entirely consumed except for an aluminized asbestOi pad 
which backs the manifold. There is light sooting in the lines leading to the helmet, especiall y at the 
left side. This indicates that some smoke and heat were being forced into the helmet ventilation system. 
The sooted ventilation tubes leading to this area were badly burned upstream, while tubes leading 
to unsooted areas were relatively intact. Indications are, again, that penetration was from the out­
side of the ventilation tubes witli smoke and heat initially being forced into the helmet ventilation 
by the incoming flow as it passed the ruptured area until the rupture became extensive enough to 
cause short circuiting of the helmet ventilation system. 
All suit exhaust areas indicated that hot gasses were being drawn into a penetrated suit and out 
the exhaust port. This is evidenced by the blackened condition of the interior of the outlet nozzle, 
the localized damaged to the outlet port spacer spring material (adjacent areas were relatively undam­
aged except where £lame paths led to the outlet), and melting of the trilock spacer pad (attached to 
the inner liner) and covering the exhaust port area on the surface between the bladder and comfort 
liner rather than the surface facing the man. 
c. Hardware 
(1) Helmet and Glove Connectors. The glove disconnects and helmet disconnects of all suits, except 
the Senior Pilot's, were in normal operating order and entirely functional with no signs of interior 
damage. The Senior Pilot's helmet disconnect could not be opened because' of debris. 
(2) Ventilation Connectors. All inlet (blue) and exhaust (red) ventilation fittings, except the Com­
mand Pilot's exhaust fitting, were functional, though somewhat stiff, with no evidence of damage to 
the locking mechanism or bore "0" ring. The areas of these fittings exposed to the interior of the 
suit are heavily blackened and show exposure to high heat. 
The Command Pilot's outlet connector (red) showed exposure to extremely high internal heat 
as evidenced by the partially melted aluminum poppet valve and missing steel poppet return springs. 
This assembly, which had burned free of the suit, was disassembled and transferred to the KSC Mat­
erials Analysis Branch for metallographic analysis. (Report to be inclu 
erials Analysis Branch for metallographic ~nalysi. (Report to be included in Appendix G) 
(3) Electrical Components. The electrical components, installed in the suits (including commu­
nications headset and harness, bioinstrumentation harness and signal conditioners) appeared to be re­
latively free of heat damage. These components were transferred to the appropriate technical personnel 
at KSC for continuity checks and functional testing. (Report to be included in Appendix G) 
d. Helmet: The helmets were structurally undamaged and appeared to be in a pressurizable condition. 
The bailer bar, pivot mechanism, and bi-Iock assembly were functional. The visors were not pen­
etrated but had been blackened on the exterior surface and had reached forming temperatures. This 
was evidenced because all visors were dished inward (concave outward) slightly with small bubbles 
appearing at the outer surface. The visor protector had melted into a shapeless mass. No external 
helmet material was observed to have burned. 
The helmet interior showed little evidence of heat being conducted through the shell as evidence 
by undamaged leather covered polyurethane foam head liners and Velcro attachment pads. There 
is some evidence of polyurethane liner melting at forward exposed edges and of charring and blackening 
of the edges of the chamois covered earcups but this heat source is thought to have been secondary 
after penetrations of the upper portion of the suit. 
e. Suit Mounted Accessories: 
The accessories carried aboard on the day of the accident are listed above in Section 4b. All 
accessories have been accounted for and examined, although some of these accessories exhibit varioUJ 
states of melting, charring, and other damage. There is no evidence that any of these components 
could have been the source of the fire. In most cases, these components were relatively well protected 
by the space suit pockets or their individual packing covers. More complete individual descriptions 
of these items are contained in Reference 11-6. 
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L'NITED STATES GO\'ERNMENT 
Memorandum 
TO Chairman, Panel 11, Medical AnalySi,S 
DATB: March 16,1967 
FROM J.A. Thomas, NASA/KSC 
SUB~: Continuity and Functional Tests of S/C-012 Crew Biomedical 
Equipment 
Report of results of TPS S/C-012 - CM-CA-034 to perform 
continuity and functional tests on S/C-012 suit biomedical 
and communications equipment and wiring. 
NOTE: Procedures used and results of this TPS are referenced 
to the following attachments. 
(1) Normal layout diagram of suit-torso (biomed-comm) wiring. 
(2) PGA wiring print V16-960241 
(3) Torso harness print 103120-D 
(4) Configuration of PLT suit wiring at start of TPS 
(5) " .. SRP 
(6) " CMO " 
1. The PLT suit w1r1ng was received in the Biomed Lab, Room 2440, 
in the configuration shown in Attachment 4. 
2. A continuity check of the PLT suit wiring was performed by 
ringing from P2 of the PGA to connector MDI-21PLl (comm) and 
MDI-9PL2 (biomed) of the torso harness. 
3. Pin 21 of P2 to Pin 3 of MDI-21PLl of the torso harness (audio 
warning signal shield, Reference Attachments 2 and 3) was found 
to be open. All other wiring was per prints. 
4. The PLT PGA was disconnected from the torso harness and the 
PGA was continuity checked per print V16-960241 (Reference 
Attachment 2). 
5. Pin 21 of P2 to Pin 57 of PI of the PLT PGA was found to be 
open. This determined the open wire (audio warning signal shield) 
of step (4) above to be in the PLT PGA. 
6. The PLT axillary electrode harness was checked for continuity 
per print with no wiring discrepancies. 
Buy U.S. Savings &nds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan 
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7. The PLT biomedical signal conditioners (ECGl, ECG2, ZPN, 
and DC-DC converter) and torso harness were functionally tested 
using a test subject and were all operat10nal. 
8. A PIA (preinstallation acceptance test) was performed on the 
PLT DC-DC converter per OCP-K-5ll0 and there were no dis­
crepancies. This test was made to verify complete operation of 
this signal cond1tioner which converts S/C power (16.8VDC) to 
biomed power (+lOVDC and -lOVDC). 
9. Communications - No testing of the PLT helmet communications 
hardware was performed due to lack of current wiring prints and 
specifications. Work to obtain needed data and technical support
is in progress. Testing will be done on a subsequent TPS. 
SRP 
1. The SRP suit w1r1ng was received in the configuration shown 
in Attachment 5. 
2. The cut in the SRP PGA necess1tated that the PGA be dis­

connected from the torso harness for continuity checks. 

3. The SRP torso harness was continuity checked from the suit 

connector MD53-00E15-6lPN to the biomed connector MDI-9PL2 per

print l03l20-D (Attachment 3) with no shorts or open wires. 

4. The cut in the communications wiring of the SRP torso harness 
n~cessitated that the ribbon cable be stripped approximately i" 
on each side of the cut to allow continuity checks. 
5. Continuity checks from the suit-torso connector MD53-OOB15-61PN 
to the communications cOnnector MDI-21PLl resulted in no shorts 
or open wiring. 
6. The SRP biomedical signal conditioners (BCGl, BCG2, ZPN, and 

DC-DC converter) and torso harness were functionally tested 

using a test subject and were all operational. 

7. The wires at the cut in the SRP PGA were separated to prevent 

any shorting and all pins of P2 of the SRP PGA were continuity

checked for shorts to all other pins of P2. 

8. There were no shorts in the SRP PGA as checked. 
9. A PIA was performed on the SRP DC-DC converter per OCP-K-5110 
and there were no discrepancies. 
10. Communications - No testing of the SRP comm. hardware was 
done due to lack of data. 
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elm 
1. The elm suit wiring was received in the configuration shown 
in Attacbment 6. 
2. A continuity check of the CMD suit wiring was performed by 
ringing from P2 of the PGA to connector MDI-9PL2 (biomed) of 
the torso harness. 
3. Pin 29 of P2 of the PGA to Pin 1 of the MDI-9PL2 (torso 
harness) was found to be intermittent (16.8VDC biomed power). 
4. The eMD PGA was disconnected from the suit-torso harness and 
the PGA was continuity checked per print V16-96024l. All wiring 
was per print. 
5. Results of the previous step determined the intermittent wire 
of step (3) above to be in the CMD torso harne.ss between the suit 
connector and the MDI-9PL2 biomed connector. Wiring in this area 
of the torso harness was badly scorched. 
6. The cut in the communications wiring of the CIID torso harness 
necessitated that the wiring be stripped approximately i" on each 
side of the cut to allow continuity checks. 
7. Upon stripping the wires at the cut, damaged wiring inside the 
ribbon cable was discovered. The wires were discolored and the 
insulation appeared to be brittle. The wiring in the rest of the 
ribbon cable was normal. The wires were identified as microphone 
signal, microphone signal return, earphone Signal, and earphone 
signal return. 
8, Continuity checks from the CMD suit-torso connector 1m53-OOE15­
61PN to the communications connector MDI-21PLl resulted in the 
following: 
<a) 	 Pins 45,46, and 41 of MD53-00E15-61PN were shorted (mike 
Signal, mike signal return, mike signal shield). 
(b) 	Pins 10,11, and 12 of MDI-2lPLl were shorted (mike Signal, 
mike signal return, mike signal shield). 
(c) 	Pins 3,4, and 10 of MD53-00E15-6lPN were shorted (earphone
signal, earphone signal return, earphone signal shield). 
(d) 	Pins 13,14, and 15 of MDI-2lPLl were shorted (earphone
Signal, earphone signal return, earphone signal shield). 
These were the damaged wires referenced in step (7). All other 
wiring was per print. 
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9. samples of the damaged wires were obtained per TPS S!C-OI2 ­
CM-CA-G93 and delivered to the Malfunction Analysis Branch (MAS).
The MAS is to perform metalagraphic analysis of these wires to 
determine temperature to which they were subjected. 
10. 	Tbe CMD biomedical wiring from the MDI-9SL2 connector to the 
biomedical signal conditioners and the DC;-DC converter was 
continuity checked per print and pins 1,2, and 9 of MDI-9SL2 
(bio.ed 16.SV power) were shorted. The ribbon cable in this 
area was completely burned away. 
11. 	Tbe CID biomedical signal conditioners (EOG1, ECG2, ZPN and 
DC-DC converter) were functionally tested using a test subject
and were all operational. 
12. 	A PIA was performed on the CMD DC-DC converter per OCP-K-5110 
and there were no discrepancies. 
U<;}. c1~44-J.A. Thomas 
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